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Introduction
Angola and Brazil are deemed to have different levels of economic 
and social development. These countries have, nevertheless, a history of polit-
ical and economic proximity, which has been highly regarded by the foreign 
policies  of both countries. A similar proximity exists in regard to the regu-
lation of foreign investment in these countries: distinct domestic positions 
and regulatory policies whilst attempting to regulate bilateral relations on the 
basis of a common axis of concessions. 
The purpose of this article is to contextualize the regulatory scenario 
with regard to foreign investments in Angola and Brazil, in their individual 
and joint activities. This analysis is part of a wider project named “Empirical 
evidences of the regulation of International Trade and of Foreign Investment 
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in Brazilian Perspective: the case of Angola”4, which seeks to identify the reg-
ulatory patterns of economic relations between Angola and Brazil, as part of a 
South-South cooperation project.
This paper relies upon a comparative analysis between the parallel 
activities of foreign investments’ regulation in Angola and Brazil, in order 
to argue that the divergences between these countries in relation to both the 
international investment agreements (IIAs) and the domestic legal reforms 
appear to have been reconciled with the negotiation of the Cooperation and 
Facilitation of Investment Agreement (CFIA), in April 2015. 
The article is structured in four other sections, besides this introduc-
tion and the conclusion. In the second section we present an overview regard-
ing foreign investments and their regulation in Angola and Brazil, as well as 
some historical remarks about the international regime of foreign investment 
regulation in order to demonstrate the context that created some similarities 
but many differences between the two countries. In the third section, regard-
ing the regulation of foreign investments in Angola and Brazil, we argue that 
the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) signed by these countries in the late 
nineties and in the beginning of the 21st century are an example of a divergent 
policy approach of the two countries. This divergence was also reflected – as 
we discuss in the fourth section – in the internal legal reforms enacted by An-
gola and Brazil, during the first decade of the 21st century. Finally, in the fifth 
section, we demonstrate that these countries have adopted a critical approach 
towards the foreign investment international regime and ended up reconcil-
ing their policy views due to the conclusion of the CFIA in early 2015.
4  This project was funded by the following research financing agencies: the Coordination for 
Perfecting High Level Personnel and National Council for Scientific and Technological Devel-
opment (MCTI/CNPq/MEC/CAPES No. 43/2013) and the Foundation on Research Support in 
the State of São Paulo (FAPESP Process No. 2014/25776). More than twenty researchers are 
associated with this project, to whom we thank for both their individual and collective contri-
butions, specially by establishing the axes of analysis of this work. Specifically, in this text we 
thank Rafael Chaves Fonseca, who assisted in the collection of certain articles and analyzed 
the Angolan investment regulations (Fonseca 2015) in his Law School degree monograph. We 
also wish to thank the assistance of Bruno Pegorari and Matheus Leichtweis in reviewing this 
translation.  
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The significance of foreign investments for Angola and Brazil: 
general remarks
Brief history
In November 2015 Angola and Brazil celebrated forty years of mutual 
diplomatic relations. The fact that Brazil was the first country to recognize 
Angola’s independence in 1975 was a milestone in the redefinition of signifi-
cance of both countries’ bilateral foreign policy, with both sharing a common 
colonial past, having Portugal as their historical colonial metropolis. Howev-
er, the processes of colonization by Portugal seemed to be different in these 
countries, what has triggered specific cycles in their histories of economic 
reorganization. 
Brazil, on the one hand, was a seat of the Portuguese Crown and, 
after being promoted to a united kingdom with the metropolis, achieved its 
independence in 1882. Later, Brazil underwent an imperial period and, still 
within the 19th Century, became a republic. After the independence, free ini-
tiative and the right to private property5 have always been acknowledged, even 
though the distinction between foreign and national capital has varied accord-
ing to the historical and the economic sector.
Angola, on the other hand, due to the fact that it remained a colony 
during the neo-colonialism period until 1975, gained its independence in the 
context of the Cold War and reflected this conflict’s polarities. In the first 
years following its declaration of independence, Angola decided to imple-
ment a socialist economy – which led to the nationalization and confisca-
tion of a number of foreign investments at that time. However, this process 
was marked by certain anachronisms, including its relation with the foreign 
capital. In the 1st Republic (1975-1991) there was a coexistence between the 
protection of private property, even of the one belonging to foreigners under 
Article 10 of Constitutional Law of 1970, the ‘economy of resistance’ with the 
appropriation by the State of the productive assets under Law No. 3/76 and 
the mandatory association between national and foreign capital according to 
the Foreign Investment Law No. 10/796. Between 1979 and 2002 Angola was 
5  For instance, the political constitution of the Empire of Brazil of 1824, art 179.XXIII already 
states that: “XXII. The Right to Property is fully guaranteed. If the legally verified public good 
demands the use and the usage of the Citizen Property, he will previously receive an indem-
nity that corresponds to its predetermined value. The Law will define the cases in which this 
exception should be applied and will define the rules that will determine if there is going to be 
an indemnity or not.”
6  According to Manuel Ennes Ferreira: “These assertions clearly appeared as being contradic-
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plunged into intense civil war and its economy was heavily degraded. Such an 
unstable situation favored gradual reforms in its economic system until the 
beginning of the opening process in 1985, which was later incorporated in 
the scope of the Program of Economic and Financial Restructuring (known 
as SEF, in Portuguese) in 1988 and, finally, consolidated under the reform of 
the Constitution in May 19917.
In Brazil, foreign capital has always been present and has had a sig-
nificant level of contribution to the gross domestic product8. Whereas, from 
the 19th century until 1930, foreign investment had a relevant role in Brazil’s 
participation in international trade, from the 1940s onwards, Brazil clearly 
adopted an industrialization policy aiming at the employment generation and 
the transfer of technology. Additionally, up to the nineties the Brazilian mea-
sures for promotion and protection of foreign investment were essentially 
adopted by means of domestic and unilateral legislation9 and 10. This develop-
tory, paradoxical and even absurd. Contradictory because, once seeking to banish private indus-
trial activity (…) they contradict the Constitution (…). Paradoxical because at a time when the 
country needed to recover its economy obstacles for the operation of the private sector arose. 
Absurd because in (…) 1979, the Law of Foreign Investment was published (…).” (Ferreira 
2002, 50). Angolan Carlos Teixeira describes this phase as “an almost uncontrollable presence 
of the State in the Economy, highly administrative, with bureaucratic barriers and rigid plans” 
(Teixeira 2011).
7  Catarina Antunes Gomes makes a detailed analysis of Angola’s economic opening process 
as well as its internal and external determining factors (Gomes 2009). The author claims that 
the Angolan economic dependence on petroleum was detrimental to the organization of a 
centralized economy (page 233) and that the international petroleum crisis led Angola to a 
financial crisis. When resorting to multilateral financial institutions, Angola became subject 
to their conditions (page 236 et seq). and the author ilustrates this situation with a quote by 
Ennes Ferreira, which qualifies “the SEF as a ‘Letter of Intentions’ addressed to the IMF and 
the World Bank, to which the government immediately manifested its interest in adhering” 
(Ennes Ferreira 1993, 13-4 apud Gomes 2009, 239). 
8  Regarding the cases of Angola and Brazil it is very difficult to obtain precise data on invest-
ments that were based on similar methodologies in the periods prior to 1990, the year when 
the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) base began to stand-
ardize and systemize investment data (http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx). In Brazil’s 
case, some literature references strengthen the perception of the continuity of the importance 
of foreign investment and its relation to Brazilian development programs, e.g. (Gonçalves 
1999) (see specifically pages 236-46), (Almeida 2003), (Caputo and Melo 2009). 
9  The only exception to this rule was the Investment Guarantee Agreement executed by Brazil 
and the United States, in the 1960s, published by Decree No. 57.943, of March 10, 1966. With 
regard to the particularities of this agreement as well as its differences in relation to a tradition-
al agreement of promotion and protection of the investments, see Nusdeo 2007. 
10  As examples of Brazilian unilateral measures, regarding specific legislation, in the com-
mercial, banking, foreign exchange or insurance sectors, see (Almeida 2003), (Gonçalves 
1999) and (Caputo and Melo 2009). The most specific legislation in this combination is Law 
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ment favored the later revival of Brazil’s traditional strategy of domestically 
regulating foreign investment, as presented in section 4 below.
In a different way, Angola has, almost fifteen years after its indepen-
dence, adopted standards and practices of a market economy, including open-
ing itself to foreign capital in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This opening en-
gendered international pressure for Angola to adopt international standards 
of promotion and protection of foreign investments11. However, considering 
its historical transition from a planned economy to a market economy, the 
reliance of foreign investment regime upon a series of administrative con-
trols and conditions as provided in Angolan domestic legislation is likewise 
noticeable.  
As from 2002, according to Law No. 05/02 on the Delimitation of 
the Sectors of Economic Activity, Angola consolidated three general regimes 
for foreign investment, based on the relevant economic sectors (i) Angola 
reserved, according to Articles 11 and 12 of Law No. 05/02, some sectors for 
exclusive operation by the Angolan government (control or integral reserve 
regime);(ii) it established some sectors that, in spite of the exclusive property 
of the government, could be exploited by means of a concession agreement 
(relative reserve regime, according to Article 13 of Law N0. 05/02), including, 
among others, the exploration of petroleum and diamonds, which have specif-
ic treatment by Angolan legislation; (iii) remaining economic sectors were eli-
gible to receive tax benefits, depending on their classification by Angolan law 
as priority sectors or priority regions12. Even though free initiative is protected 
No. 4.131, of September 3, 1962, modified by Law No. 4.390, of August 29, 1964. At the time of 
its drafting Law No. 4.131/62 had the purpose of ensuring security for foreign capital, assuring 
non-discriminatory treatment for  non-resident investors, attracting and stimulating the entry 
of investments in the country and defending the Brazilian interests, as per (Dias 2010, 82). To 
access the full text, see Law No. 4.131, of September 3, 1962, which it regulates the application 
of foreign capital and the remittance of funds abroad and provides on other measures (Brazil 
1962). 
11  It is worth noting that the historical relationship of Angola with foreign capital was ultimate-
ly constructed in the 1st Republic, starting from a system of exception, ensuring positions and 
rights for foreign investors that were not even considered for domestic private agents. This led 
the Law of Foreign Investment, in its various editions, to assume a role that went beyond that of 
a guarantee instrument against domestic instabilities, incorporating exceptional rights within 
the general legal system. Thus the foreign investment legislation was outlined as an extensive 
legal statute, with provisions on investor’s rights and duties and on matters involving foreign 
exchange, corporate issues, assignment and succession of rights, taxes, penalties, administra-
tion (as for the operation of government agencies of the government). This, or at least vestiges 
thereof, can be observed in the various laws enacted for investment in Angola: Law No. 10/79, 
Law No. 13/88, Law No. 15/94, Law No. 11/03, Law No. 20/11 and Law No. 14/15. For a presenta-
tion of these systems up to 2003, see (UNCTAD 2010). 
12  In relation to the current regulations on tax benefits and their levels, see Law No. 14/15, of 
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as a rule in the third regime, for the foreign investment in certain sectors, 
there is a requirement of mandatory partnership with Angolan companies 
(Article 9, Law No. 14/15). This requirement suggests that the attraction of 
foreign capital to Angola aimed not only at its insertion in international trade, 
most notably in the cases of the petroleum and diamonds industries, but also 
at the development of the domestic industry as a result of the combination 
between traces of control mechanisms, which were emblematic in planned 
economies, and more modern initiatives aiming at integrating foreign invest-
ment in the framework of national development policies13.
International scenario
The regulation of foreign investments started to gain importance un-
der the framework of international investment agreements in 1950. UNCTAD 
has, therefore, recently systematized IIAs historic evolution, identifying four 
periods: (i) 1950-1964, the birth of the agreements; (ii) 1965-1989, the era of 
the dichotomy between the protection of investors and the establishment of 
obligations to investors; (iii) 1990-2007, the era of agreements proliferation; 
and (iv) 2008 until the present, the era of political re-orientation, based on 
complaints and revisions of the IIAs. (Unctad 2015, 121).
These four periods may also be seen as cyclical processes. Whereas, 
during the first phase (1950-1964), there was a prevalence of the position of 
capital-exporter countries in creating rules to protect their investments in less 
developed and high risk economies, the second phase (1965-1989) was driven 
by a contrary movement consolidated in the General Assembly of the United 
Nations by host States that sought to defended the principle of sovereignty 
over natural resources and the establishment of a new international economic 
order14. As aforementioned, Angola and Brazil did not take part in the crea-
August 11 (Attached).
13  This is a perception from the reading of (Gomes 2009), as well as from the explanatory 
statement of Law No. 14/15, of August 11. We highlight this part of the explanatory statement: 
“Private investment together with public investment, continues to be a strategic focus of the 
Government, for the capture and mobilization of human, financial, material and technological 
resources, aiming for the economic and social development of the country, for the diversifi-
cation of the economy, foran increase in the competiveness of the economy, for the growth 
of the employment offer and for the improvement of the population’s living conditions” (our 
emphasis).
14  These first periods are closely related to the process of decolonization of many of the current 
countries of the African and Asian continents, as well as to their subsequent alignment against 
the oppressive regimen of the international economic system. In relation to their manifesta-
tions within the sphere of the UN, see specially Resolutions of the General Meeting of the UN 
No. 1.803/1962 and No. 3.201/1974. Access to such documents can be obtained on <http://
Investment regulation between Brazil and Angola: internal factors, international context 
and the design of the Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI)
214 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.5, n.9, Jan./Jun. 2016
tion of international rules for foreign investments: Angola was still a colony 
of Portugal and Brazil kept reacting to the internationalization of investment 
regulation with unilateral rules that provided for the promotion of foreign 
investments and accorded certain guarantees to them. 
The following phase of the development of the IIAs (1990-2007) was 
driven by forces of economic liberalization and globalization. Further than 
the 404 IIAs existing in the previous phases, 2,663 new IIAs were signed in 
the third phase, including bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral agreements15. 
In relation to the investment promotion objective, some doubts were raised 
about the effectiveness of these agreements and, concerning the investment 
protection objective, the rules contained in IIAs were associated with a re-
duction of policy space from host States, which became more exposed to in-
ternational investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms. This antagonism 
between policy space and investment protection illustrates the fourth phase 
(2008-onwards), which has resulted in specific reforms of the existing rules 
as well as in the termination of IIAs by some capital-importing countries.
Angola and Brazil participated in the last two phases of the evolution 
of international regulation of foreign investments in an attempt to combine 
their development policies with the promotion of foreign investments. In the 
nineties, both Angola and Brazil signed IIAs known, in these countries, as 
Agreements for Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (BITs). 
Angola also signed such agreements in the first decade of the 2000s. How-
ever, similarly to other capital-importing countries, Angola and Brazil have 
revised their policies in recent years, taking a more proactive position in the 
definition of their commitments. These points will be analyzed in sections 3 
and 4 below.
www.un.org/en/sections/documents/general-assembly-resolutions/index.html> (last consul-
tation in December 2015).
15  Notable examples of this diversity of arrangements, are: (i) the creation in 1994 of the World 
Trade Organization, containing rules that are applicable to foreign investments in some of its 
agreements; (ii) the conclusion of the Energy Charter Treaty, with detailed provisions on invest-
ments in this sector, among its members; and (iii) the completion in 1992 of the North Amer-
ican Foreign Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which, inter alia, creates specific rules for foreign 
investment and submits its disputes to the system of solutions of investor-State controversies. 
For further clarification on these systems, in the context of the IIAs, see (Unctad 2015, 126).
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Responses to the proliferation of regulations for foreign in-
vestments
Brazil and the BITs (1994-1998)
During the nineties Brazil signed a total of fourteen BITs16. The Bra-
zilian Constitution was approved in 1988, some years before the beginning of 
negotiations of investment treaties, and it provided, in the chapter addressing 
the economic and financial order, that ‘the law shall regulate, based on nation-
al interest, foreign capital investments, shall provide incentives for reinvest-
ments and shall regulate the remittance of profits’ (Article 172). However, in 
the subsequent years, no such law on foreign investments was passed and the 
previous legal framework established under Law No. 4131/1962 remained in 
force. At the time the negotiations, BITs followed the orientation of a model 
draft proposed by an Inter-Ministerial Working Group, created in 1992, with 
the participation of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and 
of the then existing Ministry of Finance, Treasury and Planning17. This model 
text was subsequently ‘adapted to more realistic standards, which were the 
closest possible to those recommended by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)’18. 
Nevertheless, structural and substantial similarities of the BITs 
signed by Brazil prevailed. Quite alike provisions   can be found in the totality 
of the agreements celebrated by Brazil on the matters of: (i) definition of in-
vestment, investor and territory, (ii) admission of investment, (iii) promotion 
of investments, (iv) safeguard standards for investments, (v) nationalization, 
expropriation and compensations, (vi) freedom to transfer and to repatriate 
investments, (vii) solution of controversies between  state parties, (vii) dis-
pute resolution between investors and states, and (viii) validity and withdrawn 
from the treaty.
In Brazil, the President has forwarded to Congress six out of fourteen 
16  The APPIs were executed with Chile (1994), Portugal (1994), United Kingdom (1994), 
Switzerland (1994), Germany (1995), South Korea (1995), Denmark (1995), Finland (1995), 
France (1995), Italy (1995), Venezuela (1995), Cuba (1997), Netherlands (1998) and Belgium/
Luxemburg (1999). The full texts of the APPIs executed are accessible in the database of the 
System of International Acts of the Ministry of Foreign Relations (<dai-mre.serpro.gov.br>, last 
access in December 2015).
17  As per Message 1.158, of December 15, 1994, which submitted the agreement executed with 
Portugal to examination by the Legislative Branch.
18  As per Message No. 8, of January 5, 1995, which forwarded to the National Congress the 
agreement executed with the United Kingdom.
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BITs celebrated for ratification19 – i.e., the agreements executed with Germa-
ny, Chile, France, Portugal, United Kingdom and Switzerland. These treaties 
have faced significant reluctance during the ratification process20. 
During the negotiation process of the BITs with the United Kingdom, 
the Foreign Relations and National Defense Commission (CREDN, in Portu-
guese) of the Brazilian House of Representatives highlighted two controver-
sial points which have drawn attention in the domestic debate. The first point 
concerned the compensations in cases of expropriation: the Constitution ad-
mits its payment trough instruments of public debt or in instruments of land 
reform, which could contrast with the commitment to free and prompt trans-
fer of funds, regardless of whether or not the foreign currency was available in 
the country21. If there were to be an assurance of an exception to the constitu-
tional precept to the foreign investor, this would be classified as a differentiat-
ed treatment for the latter in relation to that offered to the domestic investor. 
With respect to the provision of dispute settlement between the Gov-
ernment and the Investor, the CREDN’s opinion was that such provision 
would violate the “exhaustion of domestic remedies“, a rule of customary in-
ternational law traditionally adopted in Brazil (Brazil 2000, 21.693). Further-
more, the direct access of foreign investors to the international arbitration 
procedures would result on a leveling of the private entities in equal terms 
with the Brazilian State, which would represent a “protection of international 
investors with detriment to the national policies and interests” (Alves 2014). 
Similarly, through a parliamentary opinion, members of the house criticized 
the possibility to shift the venue during the course of the action by choice 
of the investor  since, as an outcome of the most favored nation clause, the 
same prerogative could be extended, regardless of express provision, to other 
countries with which Brazil could celebrate BITs with. (Brazil 2000, 21.693) 
Some part of the criticisms directed towards the BITs celebrated by 
Brazil ended up leading to amendments of the proposals by the House of 
19  The bills were the following: PDC No. 396/00 (Germany), PDC No. 366/96 (Chile), PDC 
No. 395/00 (France), PDC Mo. 365/96 (Portugal), PDC No. 367/96 (United Kingdom) and 
PDC No. 348/96 (Switzerland).
20  Concerning these proceedings and the particularities of the debate in their negotiations, 
see (Scandiucci Filho 2007)
21  According to the parliamentary manifestation, the “form of compensation defined in the 
text must be confronted with some of the constitutional precepts concerning the expropriation 
of urban and rural real estate” in force. In addition to the establishment of compensation pay-
ment for expropriation of land for purposes of agrarian reform in convertible currency, when 
the payment is made, in the same case it would be in instruments of agrarian debt that are 
redeemable in twenty years (Brazil 2000, 21.693).
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Representatives22 which, later on, resulted into the withdraw of the  BITs 
documents for ratification by the Executive Branch while at the House’s pro-
cessing23. Besides considering that the BITs had granted an “excessively wide-
range set of rights and prerogatives” to the foreign investors, the documents 
of the Brazilian Executive Branch24 asserted that these Agreements were not 
necessary to Brazil, which maintained its position of a privileged destination 
for foreign capital25. 
Angola and the BITs (1997-2011)
Angola began to sign BITs in 1997, before the civil war period (1992-
2002). During the 1980s and 1990s, Angola went through some domestic 
economic reforms, which have foreseen certain elements of the BITs  by in-
troducing it in its national legislation. For instance, the Law on Foreign In-
vestment No. 13/88, in its eagerness to attract capital, had offered beforehand 
guarantees for foreign investors which upheld a dialogue with the clauses of 
protection for the investors in the BITs, of which we highlight the following: 
(i) fair and equitable treatment, (ii) protection and safety, with a commitment 
to do not create difficulties for its operation, (iii) the transfer abroad of the net 
22  For example, the amendments proposed for the legislative bill that would approve the text 
of the agreement executed with Germany. The bill contained the following provisions: “Article 
2 The provision in Paragraph Two of Article 4 of the Agreement [on expropriation] may only be 
applied to whatever does notconflict with the cases provided in the Federal Constitution, par-
ticularly item III of Paragraph Four, of Article 182, and Article 184. Article 3. The expression "at 
the request of the investor", contained in Article 10 of the Agreement [concerning the solution 
of conflicts between the Government and the investor], is construed in the sense that the appeal 
for international arbitration necessarily depends on the approval of the Brazilian Government, 
when the investments are implemented on Brazilian territory. Article 4 The commitments 
assumed in this Agreement must be submitted to the regulations provided in Article 172 of the 
Federal Constitution”. (Brazil 2003, 37795-6).
23  The decision to remove the BITs from being processed in the National Congress derived 
from a proposal made by the commission created in 2002, during the presidential transition 
between Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in order to assess the BITs 
around the country (Alves 2014, 423-46).
24  “The non-existence of agreements of this kind had not affected Brazil’s position as an 
important receiver of international investment, particularly of direct investments, the inflows 
of which are among the highest in the group of developing countries. The stability of the legal 
rules within the domestic ambit and the intrinsic strength that the Brazilian economy began to 
demonstrate since 1994 explain this notable performance.” (Brazil 2002, 54.414). 
25  It is worth stressing that, according to UNCTAD data, Brazil, in 1994, the year of 
execution of the first BIT, recorded an inflow of foreign investment of US$2.15 billion, and in 
2000 this amount had reached the figure of US$16.6 billion (while in 2000 it had reached the 
peak of US$32.8 billion) (Unctad s.d.)
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profits, by means of the Ministry of Finance’s authorization, (iv) the provision 
for a fair compensation, in case of expropriation, and (v) the suppression of 
the control limit by foreign investors in Angolan companies (Angola 1988)26. 
However, as part of a planned economy, this legislation still established a 
range of conditions and counterparts of the foreign investor.
Likewise, at the beginning of the 1990s, Angola agreed with the main 
international economic organizations – the Multilateral Investment Guaran-
tee Agency, (1989), the International Monetary Fund (1989, with representa-
tion established in 1997) and the World Trade Organization (1996) – which 
strengthened the awareness for the need of investor protection. Taking into 
consideration that the amount of capital attracted was yet unsatisfactory; in 
1994 the new Foreign Investment Law No. 15/94 was adopted, mainly aiming 
to reduce the bureaucracy involved in the inflow of foreign capital into the 
country.
Out of a total of ten BITs signed by Angola, eight were celebrated 
between 1997 and 200827. Thus, in parallel with the signature of certain BITs 
during the years 2000, Angola, immediately after the end of the civil war, 
sought to modernize its foreign investment related legislation. Thereby, the 
Law No. 11/03, known as the Basic Private Investment Law (PIL), was adopt-
ed, which sought to treat both national and foreign private investments equal-
ly (Angola 2003a). Although the purpose of the PIL had been to address, in a 
broader sense, the contractual, tax and monetary aspects of the national and 
foreign capital flow, it specifically aimed to incorporate certain foreign inves-
tors’ demands, which are normally present in the BITs. Accordingly, the PIL 
adopts a broader concept of foreign investment which establishes,, assuming 
that the amount is equivalent to or greater than one hundred thousand dollars 
26  Comments on the impacts of this Law are presented in (UNCTAD 2010, 8-11). 
27  According to the UNCTAD base, Angola executed nine BITs and other eight IIAs. Of these 
nine BITs only four became effective. The nine BITs are: Cape Verde (executed and effective 
since 1997), Italy (executed in 1997, and effective since 2007), Portugal (one executed in 1997 
and the other in 2008), United Kingdom (executed in 2000), Germany (executed in 2003 
and effective since 2007), South Africa (executed in 2005), Spain (executed in 2007) Russia 
(executed in 2009 and effective since 2011) see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/
CountryBits/5#iiaInnerMenu> (last access in December 2015). In addition to these BITs, we 
had an access to another BITs executed by Angola with Cuba, a version that was published and 
has been effective since April 14, 2009, in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Angola I Se-
ries, No. 68. Thus, we assume that there are ten BITs executed by Angola so far, five of which 
are effective. On the contrary, the last report of revision of the commercial policies of Angola, 
by the OMC, shows that there are thirteen BITs executed by the country, with no reference 
to the agreement with South Africa, and including agreements with France, Guinea-Bissau, 
Holland, Namibia and Switzerland (WTO 2015, 26). However, we found no references to these 
latter agreements.
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(Article 9.3): (i) national treatment (Article 4(c)); (ii) fair and equitable treat-
ment (Article 12); (iii) free access to the markets, except in state monopoly 
areas (Article 4(a)); (iv) protection and security (Article 4(b)); (v) freedom to 
transfer profits (Article 13); (vi) fair, prompt and effective compensation in 
cases of expropriation due to justified public interest (Article 14.2); (vii) access 
to the Angolan courts (Article 14.1) access to arbitration held in Angola with 
application of Angolan Law (Article 33); and (viii) observance and full compli-
ance with the international agreements (Article 4(d)). From the foreign inves-
tor’s point of view , the PIL required compliance with Angolan laws (Article 
17) and the recruitment of Angolan work force for positions on the operations 
carried out in the country (Articles 18 and 54), alongside with other specific 
remaining obligations from the conditions and counterparts of the planned 
economy era. 
The regime established by Law No. 11/03 was supplemented by Law 
No. 17/03 which created development zones, dividing Angolan territory into 
three zones, in which the quantitative standards for investment, repatriation, 
granting of tax incentives and reinvestment would vary according to the zone; 
and by Decree No. 44/03, through which the National Private Investments 
Agency (NPIA) was created with the responsibility to monitor investment pol-
icy, management of procedures corresponding to capital flows and the author-
ization to grant investment incentives. (Angola 2003b; Angola 2003c).
The general structure of the ten BITs celebrated by Angola essentially 
reflects the following content: (i) a general purpose to protect the foreign in-
vestments by fixing traditional treatment standards, including national treat-
ment, the most favored nation treatment and fair and equitable treatment; (ii) 
a broad definition of the covered foreign investments; (iii) a general clause 
establishing the prohibition of the foreign investments expropriation, except 
for public interests, case in which compensations must be paid and due pro-
cess of law must be respected; (iv) provision for ad hoc or institutional arbitra-
tion between investors and the state, as well as the possibility of appealing to 
Angolan Tribunals and arbitration between states. 
Thus one observes that the agreements signed and ratified by Angola 
practically followed the general format of the BITs, which have also been pre-
sented to Brazil. The difference in relation to Brazil is that, since 1988, An-
golan domestic legislation had already directly interacted with the language 
of the BITs, particularly concerning the provisions for investor’s protection. 
On the other hand, it is worth noticing that relevant elements of the system 
for foreign investment in Angola were not incorporated into the BITs signed 
by the country. At this point, We refer to the duties, conditions and counter-
parts, established for the foreign investors, (e.g. to hire local work force). The 
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assumption for this situation is that Angola’s international bargaining power 
was too fragile to incorporate such commitments on the BITs basic general 
structure28. 
The genesis of the reorientation
Reforms in the Brazilian legislation
Considering that Brazil has maintained its historical position of 
non-adherence to the IIAs, the subject remained fully regulated by domestic 
norms after the 1990s. Nonetheless, many of the demands included in the 
BITs were incorporated into the national legal system by means of domestic 
reforms. As Lemos and Campello ironically affirm, only the provisions for the 
resolution of investor-State controversies were not incorporated (Campello 
and Lemos 2015, 1078)29. 
Effectively, throughout the 1990s, as a result of the process of 
re-democratization, some important institutional reforms for the Brazilian 
economic environment were implemented30. These changes, however, were 
not performed by the National Congress through law reforms, but rather by 
regulatory actions of certain Government bodies (Salama 2010, 172)31. Addi-
tionally, in some specific ways, the change in the interpretative consensuses of 
the bodies responsible for normalizing and supervising the foreign exchange 
transactions contributed to update – albeit with a lower degree of legal secu-
28 Interestingly this provision is also valid for the BITs executed between Angola and Cuba 
(2008) and between Angola and Russia (2009). On the contrary, the Angola-Cuba BIT, as well 
as those executed with Germany and Italy, contain a clause (Article 20) in which it is stressed 
that if the domestic legislation has treatments that are even more favorable, they should prevail. 
A possible interpretation of the conditions and counter-parts of Angolan legislation is that they 
are treatments that are more burdensome for the investors and thus should not be required.
29  One observes that not even Brazil made changes in relation to the expropriations of foreign 
investments or of an update of the system of expropriations, perhaps because the country does 
not have a significant history of confiscating property from foreign investors.
30  There was a progressive liberalization of the system of control of foreign exchange, particu-
larly by means of infra-legal rules deriving from the National Monetary Council (CMN) and the 
Central Bank. Since the end of the 1990s, for example, the entry of foreign capital began to be 
carried out by means of a declaratory record, not requiring any kind of authorization, on the 
terms of CMN Resolution No. 3.844/10 (Brazil 2010).
31  In this sense the author acknowledges that, although one could say that the measures imple-
mented by the Government are “mechanisms that are procedurally complicated and have legal 
base on a questionable measure”, because it concerns an abuse of infra-legal regulatory power, 
the vision that ultimately prevailed was that “the legislation of origin in the Congress effectively 
opened the possibility of the Government implementing the changes that it made” (page 172).
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rity – the Brazilian regulatory environment in relation to foreign investment 
(Salama 2010, 176). 
In a broader sense, the structural developments of the Brazilian econ-
omy, which can be seen in areas such as the increase in the volume of busi-
ness in the stock market, the increase in initial public offerings (IPOs), the 
modification in accounting legislation in order to align it with international 
standards, the minimization of investment risk and the increase of transpar-
ency and security in business transactions have contributed, by incorporating 
certain guarantees that are – by other means – sought by the investors,  to the 
creation of a favorable economic and institutional environment for foreign in-
vestments in the country.32 In general terms these regulatory and institutional 
changes, combined with the economic policy and the international scenario, 
nearly tripled the volume of foreign capital received by Brazil between 2000 
and 201533.
Despite the satisfaction with the new investment figures received, 
this was not enough, in Brazil, to completely settle the issue of IIAs apart 
from the Brazilian government. After the withdrawal of the BITs from the 
National Congress in 2002, the Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX) created 
an inter-ministerial taskforce to present options to move the Brazilian policy 
on this matter forward. At that point in history Brazil had already begun to 
register a much more significant volume of capital export, and a debate re-
garding the internationalization of Brazilian companies had already entered 
the national agenda34. The taskforce recommended the renegotiation of the 
agreements with Brazil’s strategic partners, so that in August 2005, CAMEX 
established a new inter-ministerial taskforce to define alternative wordings 
for the IIAs’ central clauses. Other initiatives seeking an alternative model 
for the investment agreements continued in various Government bodies, but 
the negotiations remained without tangible outcomes for more than a decade 
(Brazil 2008, 18-21). 
It was only in 2012 that CAMEX conferred a formal mandate to the 
32  Among certain data on these matters, see the Stock Market index that, after 2005, pro-
ceeded to reach levels between 33.000-65.000 points (http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br); the 
Brazilian Securities Commission, from 2004 to 2013, recorded an annual average of 23 notices 
of public offerings of stock (http://www.cvm.gov.br). Electronic pages last accessed in Decem-
ber 2015. Concerning the changes in the legislation, see (Brazil 2007, 2), (Brazil 2011, 2) and 
(Brazil 2013, 1).
33  Whilst in 2000 Brazil recorded an inflow of US$ 22.5 billion, in 2014 this figure was of US$ 
62.5 billion (Unctad s.d.)
34  In 2002 Brazil recorded US$ 2.5 billion of exported capital, as opposed to US$ 624 million 
in 1990 (Unctad s.d.). On the internationalization of Brazilian companies (see Camex et al. 
2009). 
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Technical Group on Strategic Foreign Trade Studies (GTEX) to explore, among 
other topics, the development of a new investment agreement that was sensi-
tive to Brazil’s necessities, limitations and international aspirations. 
Since the beginning of the negotiation process, Brazil envisioned a 
different agreement from those negotiated in the 1990s. In parallel with an 
international contestation movement against the asymmetry of investment 
relations and its regulations, the investment agreement designed by Brazil 
was equally influenced by the lessons learnt from the negotiation process of 
the 1990s, along with domestic demands for access to markets and some 
protection for Brazilian investors and investments. Hence, the GTEX began 
a consultation process with the private sector regarding the main challenges 
facing the internationalization of Brazilian companies – this process resulted 
in the publication of a report35. A draft of this agreement, addressing the de-
mands of the private sector and Brazilian foreign policy positions, was avail-
able in 2013, when it was approved by the CAMEX for subsequent bilateral 
negotiations.
Following the strategy managed by the GTEX, the Brazilian Minis-
try of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services (MDIC) started to present this 
agreement model to countries that received Brazilian investments, as part of a 
“Brazilian initiative to establish investment agreements with countries of the 
African and South American continents” (Brazil 2013)36. Mozambique and 
Angola were the first countries to execute this new agreement format with 
Brazil, followed by Mexico, Malawi, Colombia and Chile, all in 2015 (Brazil 
2015a; Brazil 2015b). 
The Agreements for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments 
(ACFIs) negotiated so far present the following fundamental characteristics: 
(i) the design of the agreement’s institutional management; (ii) the system to 
prevent and solve any controversies within the scope of the agreement; (iii) 
the rules for foreign investor protection, (iv) the incorporation of sensitive 
issues in the context of the agreement, and (v) the inclusion of thematic agen-
das, conceived to be a more dynamic part of the agreements. Even though 
it is possible to identify a standard structure for the ACFIs signed up to the 
35  The consultations with the private sector involved the Federation of Industries of the State 
of São Paulo (FIESP) and the National Confederation of Industry (CNI). The results were to a 
major extent consolidated in the report (CNI 2013). We describe a little more of this process in 
another article (Morosini and Sanchez Badin 2015).
36  According to the information of the Secretary for Foreign Trade, “these agreements that we 
are seeking are instruments of support for Brazilian investors for their actions abroad. We are 
proposing to address relevant and practical day-to-day themes, such as the granting of visas and 
others that affect the process of decision on the investment”.
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present date, we recognize that there are variations between such agreements, 
which can be explained by the different demands presented by different part-
ners. Our analysis, starting from section 5, will focus on the specific traits of 
the investment agreement with Angola.
The reforms in Angolan legislation
Historically, in Angola, the process of re-orientation has consisted of 
a combination of new reforms in its investment law, the continuity in the 
negotiation of traditional BITs and the search for appropriate standards for 
the IIAs. Since 2005, in contrast to Brazil, Angola has presented figures of 
disinvestment in the country and an increase in its own exports of capital37. In 
some way this data indicates some concerns of the country with regard to its 
legislative reforms, which led to the adoption of the Private Investment Law 
No. 20/11, recently substituted by Law No. 14/15.
Law No. 20/11 has brought some significant innovations to the Ango-
lan foreign investment system. Whilst the previous Law (No. 11/03) sought to 
maximize investment attraction to a country that had recently come out of a 
civil war, the philosophy of the Law No. 20/11 was to subject investments to 
Angolan development, attracting foreign investments in greater volume, pref-
erentially for the defined strategic areas. For this reason the law was one of the 
most extensive laws on investment, providing numerous details on investors’ 
commitments and procedures. For this reason, the PIL of 2011 established 
the principle of political and legal conformation and introduced the require-
ment of prior approval of all the investment projects by the National Agency 
for Private Investment (NPIA) (Article 52), extinguishing the system of tacit 
approval that existed in the previous law. Additionally, but also as an echo of 
the international movement of protest regarding the BITs, an important alter-
ation was the suppression of the clause prohibiting expropriation (Article 14 
of Law No. 03/11, in contrast with Article 16 of Law No. 20/11).
In 1994, in parallel with the PIL reform, Angola approved a paradigm 
for the BITs, with the purpose of creating a model of agreement to be used by 
the country in negotiations with other countries. A noteworthy feature of the 
Investments Paradigm (Angola 2014) is the , reference it makes to domes-
tic law of contracting States for purposes of – for example – (i) definition of 
investor and investments (Articles 1.2 and 2); (ii) the policy for admission of 
37 If in 2003, the year of approval of Law No. 11/03, Angola recorded an inflow of foreign in-
vestment amounting to US$3.6 billion, in 2011, the year of the new legislative alteration, there 
was a negative record, a divestment of approximately -US$3 billion. This figure was practically 
maintained in 2014 (Unctad s.d.). 
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foreign investments (Article 3.1); (iii) determination of areas reserved for the 
Government (Article 3.2) and (iv) transfer of funds (Article 7). In addition, 
the granting of fair and equitable treatment and the guarantee of protection 
and security are conditioned to the “social realities” of the contracting States 
(Article 4.1). 
In relation to the guarantees for the investor, the Investments Para-
digm maintained (i) the prohibition of arbitrary measures (Article 4.2); (ii) 
the observance of obligations expressly assumed by the States towards the 
investor (Article 4.3); (iii) the treatment of the most favored nation (Article 
4.4); (iv) the national treatment (Article 4.8); and (v) the payment of a fair, 
adequate and effective compensation in cases of non-discriminatory expropri-
ation due to public interest, with the possibility of appeal to national courts 
by the party  responsible for the expropriation (Article 5). As for investor’s 
obligations, the Investments Paradigm establishes that “the investment must 
focus on the protection of the environment and on sustainable development” 
(Article 10.2), in addition to “promoting recruitment of a national workforce” 
(Article 10.3).
Another noteworthy provision of the Investments Paradigm is related 
to the system of conflict resolution, which is different from those provided by 
other BITs executed by Angola. As regards conflicts between investors and 
States, the Investments Paradigm expressly forbids the appeal to internation-
al arbitration, determining that conflicts must be resolved “on the terms of 
the respective national legislations” (Article 14.5). In relation to the conflicts 
between States, there are provisions for consultations and negotiations, with 
possible participation of the private sector (Articles 14.1 to 14.3). In the case of 
such negotiations being unsuccessful, the controversies can be taken to the 
International Court of Justice (Article 14.4). 
To a certain extent, the Investments Paradigm sought to reproduce 
some of the guidelines existing in domestic Angolan laws, including by di-
recting mentioning them. Distinctive aspects of Angolan law – such as the 
need to contract national labor – finally found echo on the Angolan inter-
national agreement model. In turn, the paradigm also reverses many of the 
traditional concessions of BITs, which had already been previously integrated 
into the Angolan PIL.
Lastly, among the most recent legislative activities in Angola, one 
finds Law No. 14/15, of August 11. The new PIL has reinforced the previous 
proposals of associating investment regulation “with the economic and social 
development of the State, with the diversification of the economy, with the 
increase in employment offers and with the improvement of the population’s 
living conditions” (list of reasons). Imbued in this spirit, Law No. 14/15 elim-
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inated from its text the general principle of national treatment and of respect 
and full compliance with the IIAs. The new PIL also associates investments’ 
incentives and approvals with projects taking place on the country’s economic 
and special zones, duty-free zones and development centers (Articles 35 et 
seq.) – part of a national project for industrial and regional development. By 
means of this law, the National Private Investment Agency (NPIA) was extin-
guished and will be replaced by another body in the near future.
One can observe that such responses to the international investment 
system are quite recent and thus there is not enough time to understand the 
impact they will have on Angolan foreign capital, as well as on Angolan cap-
ital exportation to other countries. After all of these amendments in its inter-
nal legislation, Angola has not signed any new BITs. The only new investment 
agreement that has been executed was the one with Brazil, which sprung 
from the initial proposal of the ACFI structured within the sphere of the Bra-
zilian government. For this reason and for the sake of political-economic in-
terest, an analysis of the agreement executed between Angola and Brazil can 
be an interesting test to verify the alignment of proposals or the concessions 
that burdened each of the parties.
The bilateral conciliation: the Angola-Brazil ACFI 
Angola and Brazil, as already mentioned, have a very emblematic po-
litical relation and a quite meaningful economic tie. The asymmetry between 
their economies reflects, however, their relationship, as noted in their invest-
ment ties that shows a larger flow of investments from Brazil to Angola than 
the other way around. This flow increased from US$ 73 million in 2007, to 
US$ 1.3 billion in 2014. In contrast, the inflow from Angola to Brazil varied 
from US$ 739 million, in 2010, to US$ 803 million, in 201338. All in all, this 
flow has been growing in both directions and, as a consequence of the two 
countries disposition and interest, entailed on the negotiation of a bilateral 
investment agreement.
The agreement executed between Angola and Brazil on April 1st, 2015 
assumed the ACFI basic structure – which differs from the structure that 
emphasizes the protection of BITs investments as well as of the Angolan In-
vestments Paradigm. As previously noted, the celebration of ACFIs is recent 
and does not present many cases in Brazilian history. Also, the Angolan ACFI 
38  This is official data systematized and published by the Central Bank of Brazil. For the data 
on Brazilian investments in Angola, see (BACEN s.d.a). For the data on Angolan investments 
in Brazil, see (BACEN s.d.b).
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agreement was one of the first to be celebrated. This limits the inferences that 
can be made concerning the particularities of the ACFI celebrated with Ango-
la. Below, we present an essay that focuses on: (i) demands that already existed 
for the regulation of foreign investments in each one of the countries; (ii) 
particularities of the ACFI in relation to other agreements celebrated by the 
parties in the past, and (iii) a brief context with five other agreements of the 
kind signed by Brazil up to December 2015, to analyze their possible impacts. 
By possessing a general language and basic structure, the ACFI em-
phasizes a reciprocal investments facilitation in the economic relations be-
tween the parties and focuses on the discourse of the Angola-Brazil mutual 
strengthening. However, in addition to the discourse and the form, the An-
gola-Brazil ACFI also includes in its obligations some of both countries’ do-
mestics demands in relation to the international investment system. The first 
point to be stressed – and this point distinguishes the Angola-Brazil ACFI 
from others celebrated by Brazil – concerns the attribution of the concept of 
investment to national legislation (Article 3). This is particularly interesting 
in the case of Angola, which has altered the concepts of investment in its do-
mestic legislation and that, above all, excluded the principle of respect and full 
compliance with international treaties from the PIL. 
The ACFI between Angola and Brazil also revisits the internation-
al investment system’s most sensitive points – in the particular case of the 
BITs – for both countries: (i) the theme of expropriation and (ii) the conflict 
resolution system for investor-State conflicts. With respect to expropriation, 
it is granted to the State the possibility to expropriate, as long as it concerns 
the public interest or utility, and provided that it is not discriminatory and it 
observes the principle of due process of law39; yet and lastly, it must be accom-
panied by payment without delay of fair, adequate and effective compensation 
equivalent to the enterprise’s market value (Article 9 of the ACFI). 
In contrast to the BITs ratified by Angola, the ACFI does not provide 
to the investor the right to review the legality of the expropriation act or equiv-
alent measure and the amount of the compensation – it should be noted that 
this provision was also integrated with the Angolan Investment Paradigm, 
published a few months after the execution of the ACFI (Article 5 of the Par-
adigm). It is also worth mentioning the provision , related to a Brazilian con-
stitutional provision, that establishes the possibility of compensations trough 
government bonds (Article 14.1(v) of the ACFI).
39  One must note that the inclusion of the clause concerning the need of observance of the 
principle of due legal process is a recent requisite in the investment agreements executed by 
Angola. Actually, it began to exist in the Paradigm of Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, of 2014, and the ACFI with Brazil is the first treaty that inserts this requirement.
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In the dispute settlement part, three main points must be empha-
sized. The first concerns the valuation of the prevention and consultation 
mechanisms. The ACFI creates the focal points that provide support for the 
investments and to the investors, including addressing issues related to the 
investment in the receiving country (Article 5.1 of the ACFI). The focal point, 
in turn, performs also the role of contributing to the joint committee (Article 
5.4(iii)), which acts as a space of debate between state representatives (Article 
15). Thus, this structure also takes into account the restrictions made by An-
gola and Brazil regarding the investor-state clause. Which is to say that it as-
sures to the investor an institutional space to maintain dialogue with the state, 
however in case of litigation the investor is granted access to the national 
courts (Article 11.7). The third outstanding point, however, is more sensitive. 
It concerns the mechanism for government-to-government conflicts resolu-
tion. Until April 2015, Angola had the possibility to choose for arbitration as 
a standard in its BITs40, but in August of the same year the Investment Para-
digm established the preference for the International Court of Justice (Article 
14.4 of the Paradigm). It is not correct to say that international arbitration is 
prohibited in Angola. On the other hand it is clear that the provision of the 
ACFI differs from the one of the Paradigm41.
In addition to these specific issues, the ACFI also brings certain par-
ticular concerns that have always been associated with the developing coun-
tries demands, whether in thematic issues or whether regarding procedures 
in the regulation of foreign investment. The thematic agenda of the ACFI 
between Angola and Brazil provides for programs of payments and transfers, 
environmental legislation and technical regulations, visas for entry into the 
country, development of human resources and local labor force, technology 
transfer and cooperation in matters of sectorial legislation and institution-
al exchanges42. The thematic agendas enable the parties to negotiate special 
40  The most disseminated mechanism in the BITs executed by Angola is the ad hoc arbitration 
- either by the use the UNCITRAL rules or the Regulations of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. Except for the agreements with Cuba and the United Kingdom, the others provide 
alternatively on the possibility of appealing to the International Center for Arbitration of Dis-
putes on Investments (pursuant to the English acronym ICSID), of the World Bank. Although 
Angola is not a member of the ICSID, the BITs that establish this clause show the possibility of 
the use of the additional mechanism, formally adopted by the Administrative Council in 1978, 
in order to administrate procedures outside  the scope of the Washington Convention of 1965 
that established the ICSID. For access to the agreements, see references in previous footnote.
41  It is worth stressing that none of the ACFIs actually defined the government-to-government 
arbitration procedure. This is a competency attributed to the Joint Committee (Article 4.4(vi) 
Angola-Brazil). Such procedure will probably be established as soon as the internal processes 
for ratification of the ACFIs are completed.
42  In June 2014 Angola and Brazil executed a Protocol for Facilitation of Visas, which was 
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commitments, in additional lists, and other supplementary agreements as a 
party of the main agreement, whether to deepen or to expand their relations43. 
In this regard the ACFI seeks to reinforce symmetry beyond the formal rules, 
incorporating the idea of cooperation within the investments international 
regime and, thus considers the domestic needs of both the importing and 
exporting capital countries. 
Some of these commitments were already included in Angola’s PIL 
as a condition for the authorization of foreign capital and as legal obligations 
of the foreign investor. One of the points mentioned above is the training and 
employment of local labor force, known as the process of Angolinization of 
labor, with emphasis on managerial and leadership positions (e.g. see Articles 
24 (b) and 51 of Law No. 14/15 and Article 10.3 of the Paradigm). The ACFI 
recognizes and interacts with these concerns at the same time that it expands 
them (Exhibit I ACFI, thematic agendas for cooperation and facilitation).
Another concern of this kind is the authorization of restrictive meas-
ures for transfers that are implemented aiming to protect the equilibrium of 
the balance of payments by one of the parties, or to fulfill obligations with the 
International Monetary Fund (Articles 14.2 and 14.3 of the ACFI). This pro-
tection had already appeared in Brazilian foreign capital legislation (Article 
28 of Law No. 4131/62, as amended) and it is a common concern to Angola 
and Brazil, which historically underwent periods of economic imbalance with 
severe restrictions for the free flow of capital.
In addition, the second appendix to the agreement brings a combi-
nation of standards and principles of corporate social responsibility (RSC), 
among which the respect for human rights, the strengthening of the local 
human resources, the adoption of good corporate governance practices and 
the abstention from interference in the involved countries domestic policy 
are emphasized. This concern appeared to be already included in Angola and 
Brazil’s domestic regulation, even in the Angolan PIL, but its structure as an 
IIA is innovative. Brazil, specifically, has not presented a regulation referenc-
ing the language of foreign companies’ duties in this area44. Angola, on the 
taken into account in the thematic agenda on visas in the ACFI, as per Exhibit I, sub-paragraph 
1.2(i).
43  Daniel Godinho, current Secretary of the Foreign Trade Office (SECEX) and one of the 
Brazilian civil servants that had a main role in the formulation and negotiation of the ACFIs, 
explains that the existence of such thematic agendas transform the ACFIs, in this way, into 
dynamic agreements that develop and are perfected according to the investment relations be-
tween the Parties. Daniel Godinho Interview on April 28, 2015 (on file with the authors).
44  Until then there was only the coordination of the OECD for Multinational Companies, 
within the ambit of the Ministry of Finance. 
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other hand, due to its history of planned economy, with the necessary defini-
tion of duties for the investors, would already have elements in its domestic 
legislation in this sense. The RSC as part of the text of the Angola-Brazil ACFI 
conferred strength in an international agreement to these commitments. In 
addition, the RSC is a precept that obtained distinct nuances in the ACFIs ex-
ecuted by Brazil so far. If in the Angola-Brazil ACFI  only a generic reference 
is made to the obligation (Article 10), which is detailed in the Exhibit in the 
Brazil-Mexico ACFI and in subsequent ones, the obligations came to be part 
of the main body of the agreement. However, the expectation of the “force of 
law” disappears in the Brazil-Colombia ACFI, specifically when the RSC was 
excluded from the conflict solution mechanism (Article 23 Brazil-Colombia 
ACFI).
Over time the differences between the ACFIs are appearing, and it 
is natural that this should occur according to the interests of the parties in-
volved. However, the Angola-Brazil ACFI’s structure may be a window to the 
unknown, considering the provision about the most favored nation treatment 
(Article 11, items 3 and 7). This principle is extended “to the defense of such 
investors rights”, which could lead to a possible allegation of the more favor-
able treatment clause application granted in a subsequent agreement (e.g. as 
mentioned above, an opportunity for this kind of understanding is found in 
the case of RSC). 
In the principle-related field, it is worth commenting on the applica-
tion of the national treatment, as provided in Article 11.2 of the Angola-Brazil 
ACFI. The new Angolan PIL excluded its provision on national treatment and 
indirectly discriminates national from foreign investment. This may be an-
other point of future questioning of the ACFI, if ratified by the parties, and it 
is perhaps the most mismatching point in this new legal relationship between 
Angola and Brazil and their bilateral investment flow.
Final comments
This is not an article that leads us to final conclusions on the contra-
ry, it enables us to assess the joint construction movement behind the ACFI 
and also relevant elements for its future implementation through identifying 
historical determining factors of foreign investment regulation in Angola and 
Brazil.
In their condition of developing countries, it is reasonable that for 
Angola and Brazil the attraction of foreign capital constitutes an important 
factor in the promotion of their development policies. Both countries show, 
Investment regulation between Brazil and Angola: internal factors, international context 
and the design of the Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI)
230 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.5, n.9, Jan./Jun. 2016
by their regulatory experiences, a greater understanding – in comparison with 
that in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s – of the viability of their 
commitments in the international arena taking into account their public pol-
icies’ necessities and ambitions.
The Angola-Brazil ACFI does not respond to all of the countries’ new 
demands – mainly because it still needs to be regulated, to some extent (e.g. 
the dispute settlement mechanism) – but interacts with a significant num-
ber of them. So far, the particularities of the ACFI celebrated between Brazil 
and Angola, as opposed to those celebrated with other countries, show that 
beyond the Brazilian demands, except for the principle of national treatment, 
the main Angolan demands regarding foreign investment and its system are 
taken into account by the agreement. Specifically, the Angola-Brazil ACFI del-
egates several definitions to national legislation. This requires special atten-
tion both of the private investor and the national governmental agencies, in 
the ACFI and beyond.
With regard to the countries’ domestic legislation developments, it can 
be noted that Angola has modified its foreign investment legislation approxi-
mately every five years with revision of guarantees and important conditions. 
Brazil, on the other hand, has issued regulations that are subject to changes 
in the Federal Executive Branch’s administrative bodies. These definitions by 
domestic legislation can lead to inconsistencies with the ACFI, as it is the case 
in the discrimination found in the Angolan PIL as opposed to the principle of 
national treatment in the ACFI. Therefore, in case of the ACFIs approval by 
the domestic incorporation processes of international agreements, a new way 
of dialogue for domestic regulatory spaces will be opened. 
In this respect, the agreement itself still presents relevant points to 
be developed, for instance which institutions will manage the agreement. It 
is expected that the Joint Committee, the Focal Point and the current dispute 
settlement mechanism will have their operations regulated. These will be de-
cisive spaces for the agreement’s effective implementation and coordination 
with other national spaces. Not less relevant will be the construction of the 
continuous thematic agenda, which will depend on such bodies and their co-
ordination capacity. 
Thus, the ACFI has been introduced as a forum for effective coordi-
nation between the parties and their similar national peers in regard to bilat-
eral investments, and for the institutional design and agendas that attend and 
respond to the common aspirations of domestic and bilateral relations.
Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Fabio Costa Morosini, Ely Caetano Xavier Junior 
231
REFERENCES
Almeida, P. R. 2003. “Os investimentos estrangeiros e a legislação comercial 
brasileira no século XIX: retrospecto histórico.” Justiça & História 3 
(5): 73-127.
Alves, A. G. 2014. “As relações de investimento direto entre o Brasil e os 
países de seu entorno.” In: Os BRICS e seus vizinhos: investimento dire-
to estrangeiro, Alves, A.G. (org.), 13-169. Brasília: IPEA. 
Angola. Law No. 13/88, of July 16. Official Gazette of the Republic, I Série, No. 
29. Last accessed December 2015. http://www.scm.gov.ao
Angola. 2003a. Law No. 11/03, of May 13. Law of bases of private investment. 
Official Gazette of the Republic [of Angola], 1st series, No. 37. 
Angola. 2003b. Law No. 17/03, of July 25. On the tax and customs incentives 
for private investment. Official Gazette of the Republic [of Angola], 1st 
series No. 58.
Angola. 2003c. Council of Ministers. Decree No. 44/03, of July 4. Extinguish-
es the Institute of Foreign Investment and creates the National Agen-
cy for Private Investment, hereinafter designated with the abbrevia-
tion (NPIA), and approves its statute. Official Gazette of the Republic [of 
Angola], 1st series, No. 52. 
Angola. 2014. Presidential Decree No. 122/14, of June 4. Approves the Para-
digm of the Agreements for Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments. Official Gazette of the Republic [of Angola], 1st series, No. 
105.
BACEN (Central Bank of Brazil). No date.a. Economic statistics of Brazilian 
capital Abroad – 2007 to 2014. http://www4.bcb.gov.br/rex/cbe/port/
cbe.asp. 
BACEN (Central Bank of Brazil). No date.b. Economic statistics of Brazilian 
capital in the Country – census from 2011 to 2014 (base years: 2010 to 
2013). Last accessed December 2015. http://www.bcb.gov.br/?CENS-
OCE. 
Brazil. 1962. Official Gazette of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Brasília, Sep-
tember 27, page 10075, literally.
Brazil. 2000. Opinion of the Commission for Foreign Relations and National 
Defense [to Bill of Legislative Decree No. 367 of 1996]. Presentation 
of House Representative Luiz Gushiken. Official Gazette of the House 
of Representatives, Brasília, May 4, page 21.693.
Investment regulation between Brazil and Angola: internal factors, international context 
and the design of the Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI)
232 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.5, n.9, Jan./Jun. 2016
 Brazil. 2002. Presentation of Motives No. 401 DSF/ARC/DE-I – MIRE – 
PEXT EFIN, of December 5, 2002. Official Gazette of the House of Rep-
resentatives, Brasília.
Brazil. 2003. Bill of Legislative Decree No. 396 de 2000: substitution adopted 
by the commission [of Economics, Industry and Commerce]. Official 
Gazette of the House of Representatives, Brasília, August 12.
Brazil. 2007. Law No. 11.638, of December 28. Amends and revokes provi-
sions of Law No. 6.404, of December 15, 1976, and Law No. 6.385, 
of December 7, 1976, extends to the large corporations provisions 
relative to the preparation and divulgement of financial statements. 
Official Gazette of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Brasília, page 2.
Brazil. 2008. Ministry of Foreign Relations. Brazil and the agreements for pro-
motion and protection and investments: a historical perspective [slides 
presentation]. [s.l.], September, slides 18-21.
Brazil. 2010. National Monetary Council. Resolution No. 3.844, of March 23. 
Provides on foreign capital in the country and its registration with 
the Central Bank of Brazil, and designates other measures. Official 
Gazette of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Brasília, Article 1.
Brazil. 2011. Law No. 12.414, of June 9. Disciplines the creation and consulta-
tion to databanks with information on default of natural persons or of 
legal entities, for development of a history of credit. Official Gazette of 
the Federative Republic of Brazil, Brasília.
Brazil. 2013. Law No. 12.846, of August 1. Provides on the administrative 
and civil denouncement of legal entities due to the practice of acts 
against the public administration, whether national or foreign, and 
designates other measures. Official Gazette of the Federative Republic 
of Brazil, Brasília.
Brazil. 2013. Ministry and Development, Industry and Foreign Trade. “Godin-
ho analyzes the moment of opportunities in foreign trade.” October 
25. Accessed January 14, 2014. http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/ 
noticia.php?area=5&noticia=12762.
Brazil. 2015a. Ministry of Foreign Relations. “Brazil-Mozambique Agree-
ment for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (Note 
to the Press No. 99).” Maputo, March 30. Accessed April 14, 
2015. http://www.itamaraty. gov.br/index.php?option=com_con-
tent&view=article&id=8511:acordo-brasil-mocambique-de-coop-
eracao-e-facilitacao-de-investimentos-acfi-maputo-30-de-mar-
co-de-2015&catid=42&Itemid=280&lang=pt-BR.
 Brazil. 2015b. Ministry of Foreign Relations. “Brazil-Angola Agreement for 
Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, Fabio Costa Morosini, Ely Caetano Xavier Junior 
233
Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (Note to the Press No. 
104).” Luanda, April 1. http://www. itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?op-
tion=com_content&view=article&id=8520:acordo-brasil-Ango-
la-de-cooperacao-e-facilitacao-de-investimentos-acfi-luanda-1-de-abril
-de-2015&catid=42&Itemid=280&lang=pt
Camex et al. 2009. Instrument of reference: internationalization of Brazilian 
companies. Brasília. Last accessed December 2015. http://www.mdic.
gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_1260377495.pdf
Campello, D. and L. Lemos. 2015. “The non-ratification of bilateral invest-
ment treaties in Brazil: a story of conflict in a land of cooperation.” 
Review of International Political Economy 22 (5): 1055-1086.
Caputo, A.C. and H. P. Melo. 2009. “A industrialização brasileira nos anos 
1950: uma análise da instrução 113 da SUMOC.” Estudos Econômicos 
39 (3): 513-38.
CNI. 2013. “Report on the Brazilian investments abroad 2013: recommenda-
tions of public policies for Brazil.” Brasília. Available on: http://www.
portaldaindustria.com.br/cni/publicacoes-e-estatisticas/publica-
coes/2014/01/1,30986/relatorio-de-investimentos-brasileiros-no-ex-
terior-2013.html.
Dias, Bernadete de Figueiredo. 2010. Investimentos estrangeiros no Brasil e no 
Direito Internacional. Curitiba: Juruá.
Ferreira, M. E. 2002. “Nacionalização e confisco do capital português na in-
dústria transformadora de Angola (1975-1990).” Análise Social 162: 
47-90.
Fonseca, R. 2015. “Evidências empíricas na proteção do investimento dire-
to estrangeiro em Angola e o sistema de solução de controvérsias.” 
Work presented as conclusion of the course, FGV Direito SP. http://
bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/16723/Ver-
sao%20Final%20-%20Trabalho%20de%20Conclus%C3%A3o%20
de%20curso%20%E2%80%93%20Rafael%20Chaves%20Fonseca.
pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y
Gomes, Catarina Antunes. 2009. “De como o poder se produz: Angola e as 
suas transições.” PhD diss., Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de 
Coimbra.
Gonçalves, Reinaldo. 1999. “A economia política do investimento externo di-
reto no Brasil.” In: Vinte anos de política econômica, Magalhaes, J.P., 
Mineiro, A., Elias, L. A. (org.), 235-258. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto.
Morosini, F., and M. R. Sanchez Badin. 2015. “The Brazilian agreement 
on cooperation and facilitation of investments: a new formu-
Investment regulation between Brazil and Angola: internal factors, international context 
and the design of the Agreement for Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI)
234 Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.5, n.9, Jan./Jun. 2016
la for international investments agreements?” Investment Treaty 
News, August 4. https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazi-
lian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-ac-
fi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/.
Nusdeo, A. M. 2007. “A experiência do Decreto n. 57.943 como Acordo de 
Garantia de Investimentos entre Brasil-EUA.” In: Regulamentação in-
ternacional dos investimentos: algumas lições para o Brasil, Amaral JR, 
A., Sanchez, M.R. (org.), 303-21. São Paulo: Aduaneiras.
Salama, B. M. 2010. “Regulação cambial entre a ilegalidade e a arbitrariedade: 
o caso da compensação privada de créditos internacionais.” Revista de 
Direito Bancário e do Mercado de Capitais 13 (50): 157-184.
Scandiucci Filho, J. G. 2007. “O Brasil e os acordos bilaterais de investimen-
tos.” In: Regulamentação internacional dos investimentos: algumas lições 
para o Brasil, Amaral JR, A., Sanchez, M.R. (org.), 271-301. São Paulo: 
Aduaneiras.
Teixeira, Carlos. 2011. “A nova constituição económica de Angola e as oportu-
nidades de negócios e investimentos.” Comunicação proferida na Fa-
culdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa, March 29. Last accessed 
December 2015. http://www.fduan.ao/uploadfiles/pdfs/Nova-Consti-
tuicao-EconomicadeAngola-carlostexeira.pdf
UNCTAD. 2010. The legal framework of private investment in the Republic of 
Angola. New York/Geneva: United Nations.
UNCTAD. 2015. World Investment Report. Geneva.
UNCTAD. No date. Statistic. Last accessed December 2015. http://unctad.
org/en/Pages/Statistics.aspx.
WTO. 2015. WT/TPR/S/321. Trade policy review – report by the Secretariat, 18 
August. Par. 2.36, p. 26. 
ABSTRACT
The goal of this article is to contextualize the regulation of investment in Angola and 
Brazil, contrasting their distinctive approaches during the 1990s and the beginning 
of the years 2000, and analyzing how their divergent approaches were reconciled 
with the signature of the ACFI, in the beginning of 2015.
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